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Introduction
Of all the requisites necessary for sustainable
development, peace is without doubt the most
fundamental. In its absence it would be illusive to
expect an improvement in the human condition.
Currently, however, the developing world is replete
with civil conflicts and political instability
According to the records of the International
Institute of Strategic Studies there are some thirty
major armed conflicts around the world, the vast
majority taking place in the developing world (IISS
2000). Armed conflict interrupts the process of
development (Fitzgerald 1999; Stewart and
O'Sullivan 1999; Tansey et al. 1993); it destroys
infrastructure and communities, disrupts economic
activity, uproots populations, undermines social
capital and leads to the impoverishment and
marginalisation of its victims. Confounded in their
efforts to promote development and deliver
humanitarian assistance, donor agencies have
begun tentatively to address the complex
relationship between conflict, security and
development (DFID 2000; Annan 1998; OECD
DAC 1998).
The growing consensus on the need to address
security as a development issue was reflected in,
and reinforced by, the adoption of the Security First
initiative in Mali. In 1994 a United Nations
Advisory Mission to Mali concluded that the lack of
capacity of the police, gendarmerie, national guard
and border guards to control smuggling and
banditry was blocking both the implementation of
the peace accord and economic and social
development. The Mission proposed a 'Security
First' approach under which aid for development
and the re-integration of ex-combatants was
integrated with assistance to improve policing and
border controls. The initial success of the Mali
experiment stimulated the adoption of other
initiatives modelled on the 'security first'
philosophy, such as the Programme for
Coordination and Assistance for Security and
Cooperation in West Africa (PCASED). So far,
however, 'security first' programmes have only met
with limited success in terms of enhancing security
and stability in conflict-burdened regions.
The 'security first' approach represents an
important step in mainstreaming security in
development, but it fails to address the deeper
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structural problems that lie at the heart of conflicts
in the developing world. Theories of how and why
violent protracted conflict occurs generally
distinguish between structural factors on the one
hand and accelerating, or triggering factors on the
other (Azar 1990; Azar 1999; Galtung 1976).
Structural factors, which must be viewed as long
term, include interconnected political, social and
economic elements, such as the failure to meet basic
human needs, population pressure, distributional
injustice, the depletion of natural resources,
environmental degradation and ethnic tensions.
Accelerating or triggering factors, on the other
hand, operate in the context of the above adverse
structural factors, but involve specific events,
attitudes or decisions, which provoke or encourage
violence. Such factors may include the abuse of
political and military power, the proliferation of
small arms, ideological conflict and struggles to
exert control over natural resources.
Currently much of the international donor
communities' efforts at conflict resolution and
peacekeeping focus on policies that prioritise
mediation between adversaries, ceasefires, micro-
disarmament, demobilisation, the reintegration of
ex-combatants, security sector reform and the
overseeing of free and fair elections. While these are
important elements to any programme that is
tasked with establishing peace and stability, they
tend to focus on the triggering rather than
structural causes of conflict.
This article argues that one of the major structural
causes of current patterns of violence and conflict is
to be found in the general failure of neoliberal
policies underpinning the current phase of
globalisation, to deliver more equitable patterns of
development to large parts of the world. While
globalisation has enhanced the wealth of the already
rich and powerful (both states and people), it has
simultaneously impoverished and marginalised
many economies and peoples on the periphery of
the global economy Widening socio-economic
polarisation exacerbates social, political, cultural
and ethnic tensions and contributes to growing
levels of social unrest and conflict, particularly in
the least developed countries (LDCs).
In many situations where the inclusion in formal
economic activity has been closed off - either
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because of economic collapse, debt crises,
economic marginalisation or social disarticulation -
there has been a notable emergence of cultures of
violence predicated on patterns of primitive
accumulation, reflected in the rise of organised
crime andlor non-state military actors intent on
controlling natural resources (Berdal and Malone
2000). Analysts such as Collier (2000) argue that
greed primarily motivates the warlords and criminal
elements that utilise violence and undermine
security in many parts of the developing world and
transition economies of the former Soviet Union,
but, as this article attempts to argue, social,
economic and political marginalisation represent
equally strong motives for taking up arms.
In elaborating upon these issues the first section of
this article briefly explores the changing global
order and the role that neoliberal policies have
played in global restructuring. The second part
explores the relationship between globalisation and
economic insecurity, with particular reference to
sub-Saharan Africa, where the majority of conflicts
in the developing world occur. The third section
explores the relationship between debt and poverty
The fourth discusses the relationship between
poverty and conflict. The fifth section looks at the
new forms of conflict and how they are structured,
influenced and incorporated by the forces of
globalisation, and the final section proposes an
alternative approach to enhance security and
development.
2 The Global Order/Disorder
The end of bipolar confrontation encouraged the
global spread of capitalism as the former
Communist economies were 'opened up' and
integrated into the global economy In Washington,
renewed zeal for neoliberal policies dictated that
market liberalisation and deregulation underpinned
the global economy A new ideology, 'liberal
internationalism', inspired by Fukuyama's End of
History (1992) thesis, advocated the notion of a
'democratic peace', which maintained that the
global spread of capitalism would induce global
stability and peace. This proposition was based on
two assumptions; one that globalisation, in the form
of free trade and the deregulation of markets
encourages economic growth resulting in an
improvement in the standards of living of the
world poor, thereby reducing tensions and conflict
about the distribution of resources (World Bank
1997). The second assumption is that economic
interdependence brought about by globalisation
would render war unprofitable, because if a
country main markets are likely to be destroyed
through conflict a disincentive is created to initiate
war for reasons of vested interests (Gilpin 1992). In
this sense globalisation was thought to reduce the
previous altruism of the dominant nation-states,
encouraging greater cooperative behaviour on a
global scale through a process of collective self-
interest (Beinen 1992).
These ideas coalesced within the powerful
multilateral institutions of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank to form the
'Washington Consensus', which set the terms of
debate on the development strategies of the
transition economies of the former communist
world and for the rest of the developing world
(Manzo 1998). Orthodox macro-economic
strategies based on trade liberalisation, the
opening up of domestic markets to foreign
investment and competition, the privatisation of
state assets and the deregulation of markets were
applied with renewed vigour via IMF structural
adjustment programmes and World Bank
development aid. At the same time, new forms of
political conditionality were introduced into IMF
and World Bank policies to encourage
democratisation, good governance, greater
transparency and accountability, and compliance
with human rights norms. The neoliberal model of
development has all but replaced the
developmental model that was widely favoured
and promoted in the 1960s and 1970s.
The shift in preference for neoliberal policies is
ideologically motivated, rather than being
determined by the efficacy of one model of
development over another. Ideological fervour,
spurred on by the triumphalism associated with the
end of the Cold War, has in effect blinkered the
dominant global institutions to the actual and
prolonged effects of neoliberal reform on the
economic performance and security situation in the
poorer parts of the world.
The mood of optimism about world peace and the
benign spread of capitalism was short-lived,
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however. The transitional problems experienced by
the newly democratising states in Central Europe
and Central Asia led to a rise in nationalism and
inter-ethnic rivalry, which in turn acted to
undermine the sovereignty of states. Europe
witnessed the return of genocide with the war in
Yugoslavia. The US peace enforcement operation in
Somalia ended ignominiously with the loss of
eighteen US Rangers' lives. The debacle of Somalia
proved a turning-point in the international
communities' commitment to peacekeeping operat-
ions in the Third World.
Against this background, the perception of a 'new
world order' fast disintegrated into the notion of a
'new world disorder'. Liberal internationalists,
severely shaken by these events, have chosen to
explain such conflicts as the 'collapse of civilisation'
and a return to anarchy - a Hobbesian state of
nature in which order and rationality are suspended
(Kaplan 1994). Rarely, if ever, has there been
introspection, in which the fallibilities and
mythologies of the dominant liberal discourse
about peace and stability have been subjected to
rigorous scrutiny, let alone a recognition that shock
therapy, rapid market liberalisation and onerous
structural adjustment programmes might be part of
the security problem rather than the solution.
3 Globalisation and Economic
Insecurity
The neoliberal policies of trade liberalisation,
deregulation and privatisation have without doubt
contributed to a growth in world output and
increased global volumes of trade and capital
mobility; but mounting evidence also suggests that
globalisation has resulted in increased economic
volatïlity that undermines the basic economic
security of many millions of people and contributes
to a severe fissure between the 'winners and the
losers' in unfettered global markets (UNCTAD
2000; UNDP 1999).
The losers include some 1.3 billion people in eighty-
nine developing countries who are worse of now
than they were ten to fifteen years ago. The neoliberal
idea that somehow the benefits of global economic
growth will 'trickle down' to the world poor, has
been challenged by the stark reality of the experience
in the world poorest societies. Some sobering
UNDP figures summarised the balance of poverty, at
the end of the twentieth century (UNDP 1997):
More than a quarter of the developing world
peoples still live in poverty as measured by the
UNDP human poverty index (HPI). About a
third of total global population, 1.3 billion, live
on incomes of less than $1 a day
Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest proportion of
people in poverty Some 220 million people, half
the population of the continent, live in poverty,
and the proportion is rising.
Eastern Europe and the countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CTS)
have seen the greatest deterioration in their
living standards in the past decade. Poverty has
spread from a small proportion of the
population to about a third. There, 120 million
people live on less than $4 a day
Certain groups of people are particularly
vulnerable to poverty; these include children,
women and the aged. An estimated 160 million
children are moderately or severely mal-
nourished, and some 110 million receive no
education. Women are disproportionately poor
and often disempowered. Their lack of access to
land, credit and better employment opport-
unities inhibits their ability to be able to improve
their economic circumstances. The aged often
live their final years in acute poverty and
neglect.
While the ratio of trade to gross domestic product
for the world has been rising over the past decade,
in the fourty-four LDCs' whose populations total
more than a billion people, the ratio of trade to
economic output has in fact deteriorated since the
beginning of the 1990s (UNCTAD 2000). Between
1997 and 1999 the combined annual index of free
market prices for primary commodities, which
represent 80 per cent of Africa export earnings, fell
by 25 per cent. Despite rapidly rising export
volumes in the 1990s, the purchasing power of
exports remains significantly below the levels
attained in the early 1980s. At the same time, rapid
trade liberalisation has not been matched by
increased market access in developed countries.
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The LDCs' economic future looks bleak. Those
countries whose real GDP per capita income has
been in decline or was stagnant during the period
1990-98, 'can be expected to become caught in a
situation in which economic regress, social stress and
political instability interact in a vicious circle'
(UNCTAD 2000). Even for those LDCs whose
economies are growing, there will be an ever-present
danger that external shocks, natural disasters or
negative spillover effects from neighbouring LDCs
will disrupt economic activity, throw their fragile
growth trajectories and cast them into a spiral of
economic decline, instability and conflict.
4 Debt and the Poverty Trap
The protracted deterioration in terms of trade
experienced by the majority of low-income
countries has led to foreign currency deficits and
high levels of indebtedness. Por instance, at the
beginning of 1998 the total external debt of sub-
Saharan Africa was estimated to be $328.9 billion,
of which approximately 45 per cent was owed to
official bilateral sources, 30 per cent to official
multilateral sources, and 25 per cent to commercial
lenders. To service this debt fully, African countries
would have to pay more than 60 per cent or $86.3
billion of the $142.3 billion in revenues generated
from their exports. In fact African countries as a
whole paid more than 17 per cent of their total
export earnings to donors and commercial lenders,
leaving a total of $60.9 billion in unpaid
accumulated arrears.
For almost two decades unsustainable debt has
undermined human development in many of the
world poorest countries. It remains a profound
threat to the efforts of heavily ïndebted poor
countries (HIPCs) to achieve the international
development targets set for the year 2015. Moreover,
as Kofi Annan has noted, the failure to meet basic
needs due to the debt burden in no small measure
contributes to the level of tension and conflict on the
African continent (Annan 1998, Section 93).
While Africa cannot avoid its share of responsibility
for the present debt predicament, the international
community needs to acknowledge its own role in
creating and perpetuating the debt problem. More
precisely, it needs to recognise the ways in which
the current macro-economic stabilisation
programmes used by the international community
to address the debt crises undermine human
development and contribute to the growing levels
of human insecurity and conflict on the African
continent.
The international community deals with
indebtedness through the IMF's enhanced structural
adjustment facility (ESAF). Under the terms of IMP
conditionality, indebted countries must undergo a
package of economic reforms, which invariably
involve the following elements:
A reduction in government expenditure, by
making public-sector redundancies, freezing
salaries, instituting cuts in health, education and
social welfare services;
The privatisation of state-run industries, often
resulting in large-scale lay-offs and the loss of
services to remote or poor areas;
Currency devaluation and export promotion,
leading to the soaring cost of imports, land use
changed for cash crops, and reliance on
international commodity markets;
Raising interest rates to tackle inflation, which
often has the effect of putting small companies
out of business;
The removal of price controls, leading to rapid
price rises for basic goods and services.
Faced with severe balance of payments problems,
indebted countries have few choices - they are
either obliged to implement IMF policies, even
when they are ill-suited to their economic and
social circumstances, or risk economic isolation.
Most governments are prepared to sacrifice their
economic sovereignty rather than face isolation and
economic sanctions. As a consequence, the IMF in
its role as lender of last resort' finds itself managing
the economies of a growing number of countries
around the world. It currently dictates the macro-
economic policies of some eighty developing
countries, affecting the lives of over two billion
people, or one third of the global population.
Two thirds of all ESAF programmes are located in
sub-Saharan Africa. Many of these countries have
been subjected to IMP-imposed reforms for a
decade or more, yet the overall performance of
these economies remains remarkably poor, despite
considerable progress on liberalisation and
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deregulation. The average annual growth of real
GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa fell from 2.5 per cent
between 1985-89 to 1.9 per cent between
1990-97. During the 1990s, financial direct
investment (FDI) flows to sub-Saharan Africa
economies were negligible, despite considerable
efforts by LDCs at economic reform and trade
liberalisation. Overseas development assistance
continues to be the main source of financial flow,
but remains at a pitiful level; that is, too low to
generate any sort of development gains for the
majority of LDCs (UNCTAD 2000).
During the 1990s, per capita income has also
declined in most of Africa LDCs. According to the
World Bank, the minimum requirement for a basic
standard of living is an annual income of $370. In
1997 average per capita income in low income
countries in sub-Saharan Africa was $350 per
annum, life expectancy at birth was fifty-nine years,
infant mortality was seventy-eight per 1,000 live
births and illiteracy was 47 per cent of the
population over the age of fifteen (World Bank
1998).
Public expenditure cuts have meant that social
spending in ESAF countries has deteriorated
significantly Per capita education spending has
fallen by an average of 0.2 per cent per annum, with
the result that the number of children attending
school is on the decline. On present trends,
approximately 80 per cent of ESAP countries will
miss their target of achieving universal primary
education by the year 2015. Health spending has
been another casualty of IMF-imposed economic
public expenditure cuts, with the effect of an
increase in child mortality within ESAF countries.
The ESAF countries are unlikely to reach the target
of reducing child mortality by two thirds by the
year 2015 (Oxfam 1999).
In the majority of LDCs, levels of debt continue to
be unsustainable, despite prolonged exposure to
IMF-imposed economic reforms. The HIPC
initiative introduced by the World Bank and IMF to
deal with unsustainable debt has so far provided
little, if any, genuine debt relief. Acceptance for debt
relief, under the HIPC initiative, has proved
onerous and has generated concerted criticisms
from NGOs and some of the more enlightened
donor countries for radical reform of the HIPC
initiative to ensure a genuine commitment to debt
relief that is compatible with international targets
for poverty reduction. So far, however, the reforms
suggested by the G7 at its Cologne meeting that
propose to develop mechanisms for strengthening
the linkage between debt relief and poverty
reduction are at best weakly integrated into
strategies for achieving the internationally agreed
human development goals set for 2015. If the
linkage between debt relief and poverty reduction is
to be strengthened, ESAF must be integrated into a
broader, longer-term strategy for human
development. With regard to eligibility for HIPC,
debt relief should be provided at the earliest
possible stage to governments demonstrating -
through a Debt-for-Development plan - a capacity
to absorb savings into national poverty reduction
strategies (UNICEF/Oxfam 2000).
5 Poverty, Instability and Conflict
Globalisation, far from being benign, is now widely
recognised to have a dichotomous nature, which
simultaneously, includes and excludes, integrates
and fragments the global community (Rogers 2000;
Kofman and Youngs 1996; Cox and Sinclair 1996).
While certain states and their economies have been
strengthened via the process of economic
integration, many states in the periphery - exposed
to the twin forces of globalisation, namely the ITC
revolution and market liberalisation - have been
weakened and marginalised. Weakened states,
stripped of their sovereignty in economic affairs, are
no longer able to operate in their national interest
(Cerney 1996; Strange 1996). In a growing number
of cases the state has been so undermined that its
ability to provide basic public goods such as welfare
and security to its citizens has been all but nullified.
When governments fail to provide social welfare,
health, education and security to their citizens they
lose their legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens.
One of the only channels left open for citizens is to
demonstrate against hardship and injustice. As
Woodruff and Ellis-Jones (2000) have recorded,
civil unrest, demonstrations, strikes and violence
opposing the effects of structural adjustment are on
the rise. These should indicate to the Bretton
Woods institutions and bilateral donors that their
policies are not only excluding the poor, but are
contributing to social unrest and political instability
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The IMP and World Bank tend to distance
themselves completely from their failed prog-
rammes, blaming inadequate political will or
corrupt governance. Of course it would be im-
proper to overlook the role that irresponsible and
corrupt governments have played in the impover-
ishment and mismanagement of their economies.
But it is equally inappropriate to overlook the role
that external agencies have played in exacerbating
poverty, tensions and conflict in these vulnerable
and weak economies.
Conflict theorists have for some time been at pains
to point out that poverty, the unequal distribution
of wealth and the failure to meet basic human needs
constitute a source of structural violence that lies at
the heart of many conflicts (Azar 1990; Rogers
2000; Suhrke 1999; Tansey et al. 1993). Nowhere is
this more apparent than in sub-Saharan Africa,
where the spiral of poverty, indebtedness and
conflict is most visible. An examination of the
development statistics of sub-Saharan countries
engaged in conflict, or recently emerged from
conflict, reveals a startling pattern of low per capita
income, low life expectancy, low levels of FOI, low
levels of overseas development assistance (ODA)
and high levels of indebtedness (see Table 1).
It can be argued that the statistics in Table 1 reveal
the effects of conflict on development, but for many
of these countries economic collapse preceded the
outbreak of violence. Moreover, most of these
countries have been subjected to prolonged periods
of IMF-imposed structural adjustment programmes
which have done little to stimulate growth but
much to intensify social tensions and unrest.
6 Globalisation and the New
Forms of Conflict
The simultaneous rise in debt, loss of economic
sovereignty, weakening of the state, unequal terms
of trade and growing levels of poverty have resulted
in the emergence of what the French writer Alain
Mine call les zones grises - grey areas (Mmc 1993).
These are regions in which state legitimacy and the
rule of law have all but broken down. They are on
the increase especially in sub-Saharan Africa and
the former Soviet Union. In these regions, authority
is increasingly divided between what is left of
formal institutions, local warlords and gang or
Table 1: LDCs in Africa affected by conflict 1997
Mafia leaders. In such circumstances the risk to life
and property have grown substantially - a situation
compounded by the permissive and abundant flows
of small arms.
Of the thirty major conflicts recorded around the
world in 2000, twenty-three are inter-societal, and
many of the latter are protracted. Por instance, the
wars in Angola and Columbia have been going on
since 1963 and 1961 respectively Over time,
protracted conflicts exact a huge cost in human life
and resources (see Table 2 for details). In total, the
twenty-three conflicts listed have resulted in over
four million deaths and have cost the countries a
total of 138 billion dollars (1995 prices). These
figures must be treated with caution, however, as
statistics from conflict-prone developing countries
are notoriously unreliable. Nevertheless, they do
provide some kind of indicator of the immense
socio-economic costs that conflict exacts and give
some kind of scale to the human tragedy that this
form of conflict generates.
Yet another group of states has only recently
emerged from conflict yet remains vulnerable to the
Source: UNCTAD (2000)
41
legacies of violence. This includes Guatemala,
Nicaragua, Haiti, Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo,
Mali, Niger, Chad, Liberia, Central African
Republic, Mozambique, Cambodia, Bangladesh,
Tajikistan, Yemen. Yet other states have formal
ceasefire agreements in operation, but conditions
remain tense: these include Congo, Western Sahara,
Abkhasia, the Kurdish region of Turkey, North
Osetia, South Osetia and two large regions in Peru.
Wars and violence in developing countries have
been variously characterised by liberals as conflicts
between 'erratic primitives of shifting allegiances,
habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order'
(Peters 1994), or conflict is seen to be motivated by
'fanatical, ideologically based loyalties' (van Creveld
1991). Conflict thus perceived is depicted as
irrational and dysfunctional, as it interrupts the
benevolent processes of economic development and
democratisation promoted by civilised powers in
the North. In accordance with this view, conflict
resolution takes place when the various parties are
persuaded to see reason, to recognise the plus-sum
advantages of peace for all, and when the state is
reconstituted and the status quo ante is resurrected.
GNP per
capita $
Life
expectancy
FDI $m ODA $m External
debt %
GDP
Debt
service %
of exports
Angola 270 46 412 436 91 13
Burundi 140 44 0.5 119 120 33
CAR 320 48 4.3 92 90 7
Chad 230 46 37.4 225 65 11
DRC 110 52 -7.4 168 149 12
Eritrea 230 49 n.a. 123 11 n.a.
Ethiopia 110 47 67.9 637 152 10
Guinea Bissau 230 42 10 126 304 22
Liberia n.a. 39 291 95 n.a.
Mali 260 46 39.4 455 129 14
Mozambique 140 46 64.4 963 208 25
Niger 200 46 -7,1 341 104 17
Rwanda 210 22 2.6 592 61. 17
Sierra Leone 160 34 9.6 103 122 22
Somalia n.a. 47 0,1 104 n.a. n.a.
Sudan 290 51 97.9 187 91 9
Uganda 330 41 175 840 53 24
But the fact that conflicts in the periphery have
proved largely resistant to the international
communities' peace initiatives suggests there is
something more than irrational behaviour that
motivates and perpetuates violence in the global
periphery
The interpretation of war and violence as irrational
and dysfunctional has been contested by a number
of authors, who argue that conflict serves an
economic function in those regions of the world
where social fragmentation and collapsing states
have become the norm (Berdal and Malone 2000).
Keen, for instance, challenges the common
assumption that war is a contest between two sides,
each trying to triumph over the other. Rather, he
argues, war has become an alternative system of
profit, power and protection, in which adversaries
Source: IISS 2000
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often cooperate in their pursuit of profit (Keen
2000). In much the same vein Duffield argues that,
far from being irrational or anarchical, the
proliferation of international criminal networks,
shadow war economies and cultures of violence in
the developing world are rational, calculated
responses that maximise comparative advantage in
the periphery of a deregulated and liberalised global
political economy (Duffield 2000).
Collier argues that the majority of wars are driven
by the economic motive of greed rather than by
grievance (Collier 2000). This somewhat
determinist argument has been contested by
analysts such as Ero ( 2001) who maintains that
grievance is still a major factor contributing to
violence in many developing countries. Often, of
course, grievance arises due to the economic
Country Duration Fatalities Costs
US$m ('95
prices)
Afghanistan 1992- 72,000 1,800
Angola 1961- 1,555,000 3,350
Algeria 1992- 82,000 7,500
Burundi 1993- 208,000 126
Colombia 1963- 47,000 25,640
Congo 1997 13,000 35
DRC 1996- 100,000 735
Iran 1979 28,000 6,700
Iraq 1988 198,000 n.a.
Indonesia 1975 244,000 23,000
Kashmir 1989 23,000 25,000
Mexico 1994 5,000 10,620
Mayanmar 1985 9,000 18,300
Philippines 1968 121,000 5,100
Rwanda 1990 813,000 466
Russia (Chechnya) 1999 5,000 1,300
Senegal 1997 2,000 33
Sierra Leone 1991 43,000 226
Somalia 1991 375,000 280
Sudan 1983 52,000 940
Sri Lanka 1983 66,000 7,200
Uganda 1993 4,000 354
Total 4,065,000 138,705
Table 2 Current inter-societal conflicts
exclusion of certain ethnic or social groupings, but
this economic motivation is very different from the
motivation of greed identified by Collier. Moreover,
the motivational forces of armed groups often
change over time (Keen 1998). Groups dominated
by warlords, such as UNITA in Angola, the Khmer
Rouge in Cambodia and the FARC in Colombia,
have moved from a strong ideological agenda that
predominated during the Cold War, which was
based on grievance, to one dominated by economic
aims in the current post-Cold War climate.
Wars motivated by greed often centre on the control
of natural resources such as mines, forests,
endangered species, cocaine, marihuana and opium
fields, and lucrative trade routes for illicit traffic.
They tend to be less to do with taking control of the
state. In this context, control of the state and state
borders has become increasingly meaningless. The
state has in effect been replaced by multiple centres
of authority dominated by local elites or 'warlords',
who may not even have a particular interest in
capturing the reins of government, except perhaps
as a means to extend their commercial activities. To
describe such conflicts as interstate, as is so
commonly done, is misleading, as the very phrase
presupposes there is a 'state' over which, and inside
which, combatants are fighting. Duffield (1998)
prefers to refer to these types of conflict as 'post-
modern', a phrase which takes account of 'the
emergence of long-term political and economic
projects that no longer need to anchor political
authority in conventional territorial, bureaucratic or
consent-based structures.
For many actors in conflict, war makes rational
economic sense, not only because it enhances their
local status and wealth, but also because it is rooted
in the power relations in the global status quo ante.
War prövides ample opportunities for elites to
develop links with the global economy via the
diamond trade, money laundering, drug and gun
smuggling. War economies such as those that have
evolved in Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democratic
Republic of Congo are highly integrated into both
legitimate and illegitimate global markets, reflecting
a symbiotic relationship between current patterns
of globalisation and conflict. This is most starkly
illustrated in the relationship between global
corporations and local military elites. During the
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Mozambique war, British Petroleum was obliged to
pay what was effectively protection money to
members of Frelimo, whilst Renamo obtained
regular payments from a subsidiary of Lonhro, for
protecting the Beira oil pipeline (Keen 1998: 16).
Until the recent campaign to control the conflict-
diamonds trade, De Beers bought up the diamonds
traded by UNITA to sell in the global market-place;
and in the Congo, Laurent Kabila reportedly
received £30 million from a consortium of South
African and Namibian businesses, as well as the
Namibian Government, to finance his military
campaign against the rebels threatening to
overthrow his government (Pythian and Duval-
Smith 1998).
Militarised elites, both inside and outside
government, have been able to manipulate control
over local resources and generate political support
via the distribution of rewards to followers,
reinforcing and strengthening the evolution of the
kieptocratic state on the one hand (Bayart, Ellis and
Hibou 1999) or leading to its fragmentation and
collapse on the other (Zartman 1995) - a situation
in which warlords and criminal networks flourish.
In both situations the gun has replaced the rule of
law, bestowing political and economic power. It has
become a means to accumulate wealth and a
guarantor of personal security Berdal (1996: 17)
has noted that, in such a context, 'weapons always
have an economic as well as a security value'. The
widespread resort to arms can thus be viewed as a
Darwinian form of survival through the use of force
in situations where formal guarantees of economic
and physical security have broken down.
Collectively, these observations help to explain the
durability of violence and conflict in the periphery,
and the general resistance that they have to the
international community's attempts at conflict
resolution and international peace-brokeririg
(Berdal and Malone 2000). Far from being the
irrational responses of primitives, these 'post-
modern' forms of conflict are highly rational in a
situation of economic scarcity and exclusion
(Duffield 2000). But more than this, these forms of
conflict are a product and a process of the evolving
global order, not an aberration as is often assumed
in liberal discourse.
7 Security and Sustainable
Development
The traditional discourse on security and
development is found wanting in a world where
familiar boundaries, structures of authority and
identity are breaking down.
For far too long the concept of security has been
tied to the idea of territorial security, the protection
of national interests in foreign policy (or the idea of
global security free from the threat of a nuclear
holocaust). These concepts have overlooked the fact
that for many millions of people the greatest threats
to their security come from disease, hunger,
unemployment, crime, social conflict, political
repression and environmental hazards. In recog-
nition of this hiatus, there has been a shift in the
referent point of security from one that lays stress
on territoriality and sovereignty, to one that
emphasises human security
Human security is here understood as 'freedom from
fear and freedom from threat', and is concerned with
economic security, food security, health security,
environmental security, personal security,
community security and political security These
elements form an interdependent whole. When the
human security of people is endangered anywhere
in the world, other nations are often drawn in. The
problems of famine, disease, drug trafficking,
terrorism, ethnic disputes and social disintegration
know no borders. Their consequences traverse the
globe. Thus the provision of guarantees for human
security to those most threatened in their daily lives
ensures greater global security
The challenge o! transforming an environment that
marginalises and impoverishes people with one that
provides sustainable livelihoods is a starting point
for guaranteeing human security for all. The
emphasis placed on sustainable development rather
than on more orthodox economic growth strategies
derives from a realisation that policies of
development based on material enrichment, as
measured by gross national product (GNP) per
capita, have not necessarily improved the
conditions of the vast majority of the populations of
the developing countries of the world. In fact,
despite growth in GNu poverty and deprivation has
been on the increase and with it a growing
incidence of human insecurity and violence.
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The paradigm of sustainable human development
values human life for itself. It does not value life
simply because people can produce or consume
material goods. Nor does it value one person life
over another (UNDP 1994). In this paradigm, no
human being ought to be condemned to a short life
just because they are born in a certain region or
country are a certain race or sex. Development
should allow individuals the choice to explore their
human potential to the full and to put their
capabilities to best use. The universal right to life is
the link between the needs of human development
in the present and those of the future - especially
the needs for environmental preservation and
regeneration. The strongest argument for protecting
the environment is the right of future generations
to opportunities similar to the ones earlier
generations have enjoyed.
The universal right to life is also the common thread
which binds the notion of sustainable human
development to that of human security The fear or
the reality of want and of physical threat are the
major factors that contribute to the insecurity for
the poor and marginalised in the developing world.
In the sense in which sustainable human
development provides an ethical and normative
framework conforming with certain fundamental
universal moral values about the right to life and
freedom of choice, it can also be viewed as a tool
for conflict prevention and local and regional
security
The recognition of the need to manage economic
reforms in such a way as to enhance, rather than
undermine, political stability has been forced rather
reluctantly on the agendas of the Washington
institutions by the experience of the East Asian
crisis. lt has opened the way to an acknowledg-
ement that governments must be fully involved in
defining the reform process and that programmes
must not be imposed formulaically, but instead
tailored to each country particular political and
economic circumstances. Eut if economic inequality
is to be challenged effectively as a source of
structural violence, the international institutions
need to do far more than simply tinker with
reforms. There needs to be a fundamental
transformation of the ideological foundatioñs upon
which these institutions legitimise themselves.
Global security will not be enhanced until such
time as the existing economic orthodoxy is
challenged and replaced.
8 Conclusion
The neoliberal view of globalisation as a benign
process encouraging peace and development lives
on as the dominant doctrine of the multilateral
organisations. Yet the protracted failure of IMF- and
World Bank-imposed reforms to deliver the most
basic of human needs to over 20 per cent of the
global population, is a testimony to their failure as
a model of both development and stability Rather,
neoliberal policies constitute a form of structural
violence that places the greed of the few above the
basic human security of the many
Increasingly, demands are being made for a reform
of the current patterns of globalisation to redress its
destabilising effects (DFID 2000; Hellenier 1999;
UNDP 1999). Kofi Annan (2000), in his Millenium
Assembly speech, observed that the best way to
prevent conflict is to promote healthy and balanced
economic development, combined with human
rights, minority rights and political arrangements in
which all groups are fairly represented. To achieve
this will require the adoption of a different model of
development to that which currently dominates the
multilateral agenda.
Attempts to articulate an alternative value system
for the global economy are to be found in the
'Alternative Declaration' produced by the NGO
Forum at the Copenhagen Summit. It lays stress on
equity participation, self-reliance and sustainability.
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The 'Alternative Declaration' 'rejects the economic
liberalism accepted by the governments of the
North and South, seeing it as a path to aggravation
rather than the alleviation of the global social crisis.
Moreover, it identifies trade liberalisation and
privatisation as the cause of the growing concen-
tration of wealth globally' (Thomas 1998: 459). Its
alternative conception of development values
diversity above universality, and is based on a
different conception of rights than that which is
articulated by the 'Washington Consensus'. It poses
a challenge to the economic orthodoxy and existing
global structures of power, and intrinsically
establishes a relationship between globalisation and
the rising insecurity in the developing world. In the
absence of a doctrinal change that concretely deals
with the suffering and marginalisation caused by
the inequities of the global system, the spectre of
disorder, instability, crime and violence will only
grow. These are, after all, the rational responses to
the survival of the fittest in a global system that puts
profit before people's basic needs.
Note
1. The criteria defining an LDC include low income as
measured by GDP per capita, weak human
resources as measured by a composite index based
on indicators of life expectancy at birth, per capita
calorie intake, combined primaly and secondary
enrolment and adult literacy, low levels of economic
diversification, as measured by a composite index
based on share of manufacturing in GDP, share of
labour force in industry, annual per capita
commercial energy consumption, and UNCTAD
export concentration index.
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